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Abstract
This paper challenges the existing state-of-knowledge about legislative caucuses by
arguing that the caucus system reflects and reinforces formal organizing institutions, such
as parties and committees, rather than counterbalancing them. We argue that legislators
engage in the caucus system in order to maximize the social utility of their relationships.
Using a social network framework, we develop and test hypotheses that seek to ascertain
the types of legislators that benefit most from the caucus network. We collect data on the
complete population of caucuses and their members from the first session of the 110th
U.S. House of Representatives and conduct social network and regression analyses to
find evidence that the caucus system both supports the hierarchical structure of the formal
leadership institutions and offers a meaningful way for all members to establish and
maintain relationships with their colleagues.
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Introduction
In this study we challenge the existing literature on caucuses in the U.S. Congress
by arguing that the caucus system mirrors the formal organizing institutions, such as
parties and committees, rather than acting as a structural counterbalance to these
institutions. The argument presented here focuses on caucuses as social institutions that
provide legislators with the opportunity to interact with colleagues who might share
interests, concerns, or who might help them advance their position in the institution. Our
study differs from prior studies on caucuses in two primary ways. First, while prior
research conveys caucuses as institutions that help legislators at a structural disadvantage
(such as junior members), we view the caucus system as a mirror of existing ingrained
institutions that provide power to those who are leaders, more senior, or electorally safe.
Second, we collect data on the complete population of caucuses and their members that
allows us to engage in a social network analysis of caucuses. Our data allow us to
discern whether those at a structural or social disadvantage effectively use the caucus
system to connect to their colleagues and we find no support for the conventional
wisdom. Rather, much like parties and committees, caucuses help those with power to
maintain power and may provide no additional network advantage to legislators who are
looking for a way to improve their status in the Congress.
Existing literature suggests that the caucus system, as an informal institution
within the Congress, benefits those legislators who find themselves relatively
disadvantaged within the formal legislative structure (see especially Ainsworth and Akins
1997; Hammond 1998). In other words, the caucus system constitutes an alternative
institutional framework within which rank-and-file members, junior legislators,
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preferences outliers, and other actors in formally weak positions can build their
reputations in the legislature and gain influence on policy-making processes and
outcomes.
Our conception of the caucus system as a social network challenges this view. We
consider the caucus system to be an informal institution that allows legislators to build
and maintain relationships within the House. Not all relationships are created equal,
however, and being associated with some colleagues is more valuable to individual
members than others. Therefore, legislators engage in the caucus system in an effort to
maximize the social utility of their relationships. They achieve this goal by associating
themselves with those actors who are already powerful within the formal institutional
structure, because being connected to a party or committee leader, or to a senior
colleague, is more valuable than being linked to just another rank-and-file member. As a
result, we expect the caucus system not to serve as an alternative institutional structure
utilized primarily by formally disadvantaged members of the House to counter-balance
their structural weaknesses, but to constitute an informal institutional framework that
replicates and reinforces the formal distribution of power and influence within the
legislature. Our analysis of the caucus network in the 110th Congress supports this
updated view of the purpose of caucuses. We show that formally powerful players, such
as legislative leaders and senior members, are both more connected and more central
within the caucus network.
Our study goes beyond previous research on caucuses in the Congress in
theoretical, methodological, and empirical terms. Theoretically, the existing literature
does not account for the inherent social nature of caucuses, while our paper is built on the
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contention that research on legislative organization should account for the social
relationships between legislators as much as the characteristics of individuals. In
methodological terms, using social network analysis allows us to test the validity of
existing accounts of caucuses in the House of Representatives beyond what traditional
qualitative and quantitative methods have to offer. It allows us to evaluate the received
wisdom on congressional caucuses in a more extensive and refined fashion. Finally, our
dataset on caucus memberships is the most comprehensive one to date because we
analyze legislators’ self-reports of caucuses they joined and we use this information to
generate complete caucus membership lists, which are not otherwise published.

Legislatures as Social Networks
The idea that networks are inherent in politics is not new, and political scientists
have incorporated the concepts of interdependence into empirical and game theoretic
models for many years. While political scientists have hesitated to adopt the distinctly
sociological method and structural analysis that have become popular in other academic
disciplines, political scientists would be remiss to conclude that the basic assumptions of
rational choice theory are at odds with social network analysis. Knoke has offered that
game theory and social network analysis are logically compatible because they both
consider actors to be interdependent. “Game theory offers perhaps the best opportunity to
integrate rational political theory with the structural approach” (Knoke 1990, 38). Social
network analysis is becoming increasingly popular in political science and there is
intellectual and methodological room for a new paradigmatic approach.
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To date, there exist a few studies that examine legislatures as social networks.
Some have examined social connectedness between legislators via cosponsorship
behavior. Most notably, Fowler develops a measure of “connectedness” from bill
cosponsorships that significantly predicts roll call vote choice, controlling for ideology
and partisanship (2006). In addition, Gross and Shalizi examine cosponsorship networks
while accounting for the systematic clustering of observations that is inherent in network
data (2007; also see Burkett and Skvoretz 2001). Porter, et al. (2005) study linkages
between legislators via committees and demonstrate connectivity between committees
based on shared membership as well as hierarchical relationships between committees in
the chamber. They use this information to reveal ideological preferences that predict roll
call voting behavior, independent of party or other ideological measures. Whether
through cosponsoring bills or committee service, there are clearly many ways for
legislators to form networks with one another and studies are just beginning to tap the
complexity and richness of these approaches (see also Whiteman 1995; Crisp, et al. 2004;
Carpenter, et al. 2004; Esterling 2007; Koger, et al. 2008; Gimpel, et al. 2008).

Caucuses in the Congress
In this project we are interested in the social connections that legislators form
through informal legislative organizations.i Most legislatures have formal means of
organizing their members, most importantly through parties and committees. In addition,
many legislatures have less formal organizations through which their members organize
to express concern for common issues. In the United States Congress, for example, there
are more than 400 legislative member organizations outside of the formal party caucuses,
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which range in topic from the well-known Congressional Black Caucus to the Minor
League Baseball Caucus.ii
The existing literature has identified three purposes of the caucus system. First,
caucuses allow legislators to signal their policy preferences and priorities to their
colleagues and constituents. Second, they serve as venues for the exchange of
information within the legislature (Fiellin 1962; Ainsworth and Akins 1997; Stevens,
Miller, and Mann 1974; Stevens, Mulhollan and Rundquist 1981). Third, they allow for
the coordination of legislative action outside the formal party and committee structure
(Fiellin 1962; Stevens, Miller, and Mann 1974; Loomis 1981; Hammond, Mulhollan and
Stevens 1983; Miller 1990; Vega 1993; Hammond, et al. 1985, Hammond 1991, 1998).
Aside from specifying these three principal functions of the caucus system, the
extant literature also identifies the primary users and beneficiaries of this informal
legislative institution. As Ainsworth and Akins observe, much of the existing work on
caucuses “has argued that caucuses augment the formal institutional structure of
Congress by offering members a means to gain information and affect policy across
conventional institutional boundaries, including those dividing committees, parties, and
constitutencies” (1997, 408). In other words, existing research suggests that caucuses
provide for an extensive, informal structure for legislative action that exists parallel to the
formal institutional organization of parties and committees.
Previous work also suggests that this informal structure allows those legislators
who are relatively disadvantaged in the formal institutional framework of legislative
politics to counter-balance their structural weaknesses by engaging themselves in the
informal political arena of the caucus network. Hammond’s research, for example, argues
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that that those who are advantaged in the formal institutional structure, such as party and
committee leaders and senior legislators, are less likely to join and participate in
legislative caucuses. Instead, it is junior members and those with no formal leadership
position who use caucuses to advance their legislative objectives and to build their
reputation and standing within the institution (Hammond 1998). Meanwhile, Ainsworth
and Akins suggest that caucuses are composed of policy outliers, and that the caucus
system exists to counterbalance the dominant committee system (Ainsworth and Akins
1997). According to this research, caucus membership is not just about signaling,
information exchange, and policy coordination, but also critically about advancing
individual legislators’ political and policy ambitions.
Conceptualizing caucuses as a social network between legislators causes us to
challenge the view that the caucus system is a sort of “welfare” system for disadvantaged
legislators. We consider the social nature of the caucus system to be the integral reason
for its existence, and we maintain that joining and participating in caucuses is about
building and maintaining relationships and associations with other legislators. We also
assume that some relationships are more valuable than others. These two basic insights
compel us to question some of the key propositions of the existing literature on caucuses
in the House, most importantly the suggestion that caucuses exist in order to advance the
interests and positions of those disadvantaged in the formal legislative structure of parties
and committees.
If it were true that the caucus system exists to supplement this formal legislative
structure without replicating it, we should expect to find formally disadvantaged
legislators to rise to “the top” of the caucus system. The people at the helm of the caucus
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system should be different from those at the top of the formal legislative structure of
parties and committees. If, on the other hand, caucus membership is about legislators
trying to maximize the utility of their social connections, they should seek to connect to
those colleagues who are already powerful within the formal legislative structure, such as
party leaders, committee leaders, and senior members. If this were the case, however, we
should expect legislators in formally powerful positions to be advantaged within the
caucus system as well. According to this view of the caucus system, it does not simply
supplement the formal legislative structure, but it replicates and reinforces the
distribution of power and influence within it. If this proposition were correct, we should
expect to find that:
Hypothesis 1: Legislators who are party or committee leaders should join more
caucuses and be both more connected and more central within the caucus
network.
Hypothesis 2: Senior members should join more caucuses and be both more
connected and more central within the caucus network.
These hypotheses directly contradict the existing literature. If the existing
conception of the caucus system reflects the make-up of the system, then party and
committee leaders, as well as senior members, should not be more central in the caucus
system because, according to prior studies on this subject, the caucus system exists to
counterbalance the power networks found in the formal institutions within the House.
However, if the caucus system is primarily a social network that provides legislators with
the opportunity to cultivate valuable relationships, we should expect the structure of the
caucus network to mirror the known power structure in the House.
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Further, electoral vulnerability is an indicator of structural strength within the
institution of Congress. If our theorized conception of the caucus network is accurate—
that it exists to reinforce the power of those with high rank in the traditional institutional
structures—then those who do not live in fear of their next election should be at greater
liberty to join caucuses and use them to enhance their position in the network. We
therefore expect that electorally safe legislators will join more caucuses and be more
central and more connected via the caucus network.
Hypothesis 3: Electorally safe legislators should join more caucuses and be both
more connected and more central within the caucus network.
If, on the other hand, the existing literature were correct in arguing that the
informal social structure provided by membership in caucuses constitutes an alternative
avenue for legislative influence for those disadvantaged within the formal institutional
structure, we should expect these disadvantaged legislators to seek membership in
numerous caucuses and to try to become key players in the caucus network.
While the extant literature on caucuses suggests that disadvantaged legislators are
more likely to join and become key players in the caucus system than those who already
hold positions of influence, it is somewhat vague on what it means by disadvantaged. In
addition to using a social network framework to challenge this view, we offer a more
targeted theory about what it means to be a disadvantaged legislator. The legislative
characteristics described above—leadership, seniority, and electoral security—are
examples of institutional advantages that some legislators have. However, some
legislators may have other characteristics, such as race or gender, that place them at a
disadvantage. Evidence suggests we should expect female legislators and racial
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minorities to behave in a manner similar to other legislators with disadvantages—they
should use the caucus system to help them overcome their disadvantages.
We can go further in testing the applicability of the alternative institutional
structure proposition by examining the positions of other disadvantaged members in the
legislature. While we have hypothesized that being at a structural disadvantage in
Congress would not make one more likely to join and be connected via caucuses, we can
also test whether being at a social disadvantage has the same effect (e.g., being female or
an ethnic minority). We can further ask whether being a member of a socially
disadvantaged group makes one more likely to use the caucus system crutch than one
who is structurally disadvantaged. Evidence shows that female legislators are at a
disadvantage compared to male legislators when it comes to attaining positions of
leadership, seniority, and preferred committee assignments (see McGlen and O’Connor
1998, 88-90). In addition, legislators who are ethnic minorities may face a disadvantage
in achieving legislative goals (Volden and Wiseman 2007). While we do not dispute
such evidence, we do not expect that being a member of a socially disadvantaged class
makes one more likely to rely on the caucus system for network assistance than being a
member of a structurally disadvantaged class. Since we expect the caucus system to
mirror the existing institutions in the House, we expect legislators’ structural positions to
have a greater impact on their use of the caucus system than their gender or ethnic
identity.
Hypothesis 4: Female and ethnic minority legislators are no more likely to join
caucuses, to be more connected, and to be more central within the caucus
network than male or Caucasian legislators.
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Data
In social network analysis it is important for researches to analyze populations, as
opposed to samples of populations, because it is mathematically uncertain what it means
to take a random sample of relationships. For that reason, we have opted to study the
complete population of the first session of the 110th Congress (2007) and its House
legislative caucuses. We have chosen the 110th Congress because it is the most recent
completed congress. Although the 110th Congress is a congress in which party control
changed power, we do not have any reason to believe that the 110th Congress is an
anyway sufficiently different from prior congresses such that we could not generalize
from these results.iii Determining the population of caucuses and their members is a
somewhat ambiguous, and certainly challenging, task.
The caucus data for this project comes from the 2008 Winter edition of the
Congressional Yellowbook. This directory includes descriptive entries for each member
of the 110th Congress and lists the self-reported caucus memberships for each legislator.
We used these data to construct a complete population of the caucuses and caucus
memberships for the 110th Congress because no comprehensive list of caucuses and their
members exists. The House Committee on Administration lists 276 “official” caucuses on
their website. These groups have registered with the committee as official House groups
that follow specific guidelines; however, hundreds more groups are known to exist. The
Congressional Research Service generated a list of caucuses in the 110th Congress in the
spring of 2008 and listed 394 House or joint caucuses. However, our search of selfreported caucus memberships from the Yellowbook survey includes 559 distinct
caucuses.iv We therefore constructed various samples of caucuses (i.e., those with more
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than 2 members, those with more than 4 members, those that only appear in the CRS
report, those that only appear on the House Administration website, etc.) and conducted
all analyses on all samples. We have found no substantive differences in these results and
therefore report results from the sample of caucuses that have 2-or more members, which
includes 452 caucuses. All discussion below is about the complete membership of these
452 caucuses.

Social Network Analysis
To analyze the caucus-based network in the House of Representatives, we have
generated a relational matrix consisting of the members of the House of Representatives
in which the ties between persons are determined on the basis of membership in the
House caucuses (Borgatti, et al. 2002). The resulting "caucus network" uses common
membership in one or more caucuses as a measure of strength. In other words, we are
looking at an n x n adjacency matrix A (here: 438 x 438), representing all the caucusbased ties in a network for the 110th Congress such that aij represents the total number of
joint caucus memberships. Aij = 0 if the ith legislator does not share membership in any
caucuses with the jth legislator and 1 ≤ aij ≤ 54 if he or she does (54 is the maximum
number of joint caucus memberships of any two members). Our data are undirected, or
symmetric: if actor A and actor B are in at least one caucus together, then they are
connected and we make no assumptions about the direction of their connection.
Given the large number of caucuses, and the inclination of Congressmen and
Congresswomen to join a substantial number of them, it is not surprising to find that the
resulting network is quite dense, as 93 percent of all possible ties are present. This high
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density makes for a great degree of “reachability”: all actors can “reach” one another
through the caucus network. Moreover, the great majority of them are directly connected
to one another, as the average geodesic distance (describing the shortest possible “walk”
from one actor to another) is 1.066. Everyone in the Congress can be reached within 2 or
fewer steps, and most (93.4 percent) in one single step.
The network density for Democrats and Republicans is quite high, but higher for
Democrats at 96 percent, compared to 90 percent for Republicans. In other words,
Democrats are more connected with each other in the caucus network than Republicans.
This may be a reflection of the fact that the Democrats held the majority in the 110th
Congress. For the two parties, we also seek to identify the number of ties that exist
between network members from the same party relative to the number of ties between
members who are not from the same party. The External-Internal (E-I) index takes the
number of ties between members of one party to members of other parties, subtracts the
number of ties between members of the same party, and divides by the total number of
ties. The resulting index ranges from -1 (all ties are internal to the group) to +1 (all ties
are external to the group). This index shows a prevalence of internal (92,090 or 52%)
over external (85,790 or 48%) ties, yielding an E-I index of -0.04: members of the House
are thus slightly more connected within their party than across parties. The caucus
network is thus characterized by a modest degree of homophily, the tendency of
individuals to form ties with similar others.
To measure the level of connectedness between any two actors more
comprehensively, we rely on the concept of maximum flow, which considers how many
actors that are directly adjacent to node A lead to pathways to node B. If this number is
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large, A and B are more connected, since there are numerous ways for them to reach each
other.v The maximum flow algorithm thus takes into account all connections between all
actors, not just the most direct paths between actors. Maximum flow measures for
Congress range from 0 to 6766, with an average of 2026.84 (standard deviation 1107.2).
The pairs of Congressmen that have the highest maximum flow scores are listed in Table
1. It is notable that these dyads are comprised exclusively of Democrats. In fact, the only
Republicans that appear in the top 100 most connected dyads are Rep. English
(Pennsylvania-3rd) and Rep. Wilson (South Carolina-2nd).
[TABLE 1 HERE]
We can also observe that three legislators are particularly closely connected: Rep.
Waxman (Democrat, California-30th), Rep. Van Hollen (Democrat, Maryland-8th), and
Rep. Doggett (Democrat, Texas-25th). In the jargon of social network analysis, these
three form an F-group, that is, a group of legislators who are connected to each other
through particularly strong ties, which is defined as the largest number of ties that exists
between any three or more actors in the whole network (52 in the case at hand). Also very
closely connected to this trio is Rep. Moran (Democrat, Virginia-8th) with whom the
three form a four-actor group based on 47 joint caucus memberships. Rep. Van Hollen
currently serves as the Chair of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee,
meaning his chief job is to help raise money for his colleagues—being well connected is
a certain asset for this job.
These names also appear among the list of most central actors in the network.
There are several ways of measuring centrality within networks; here, we use two. First,
we are interested in determining which actors have more ties than other actors. An actor
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with more ties might be considered more powerful than an actor with fewer ties, because
more ties mean more avenues of access for information. For this we use degree centrality
(Proctor and Loomis 1951; Wasserman and Faust 1994). Our second measure,
Bonacich’s eigenvector centrality (Bonacich 1972), does not merely examine the number
of connections that Member A has within the network, but also takes account of the
connectedness of those actors Member A is connected with. That is, the centrality of
Member A is a function of her own connections, as well as the connections of those
adjacent to her.vi Table 2 lists the 20 most central actors in the Congress network.
Notably, several of the names we saw in the connectedness measures above also make it
to the top of the list of most central actors (Rep. Waxman, Rep. McNulty, Rep. McIntyre,
Rep. Doggett, Rep. Hinchey, Rep. McDermott, Rep. Van Hollen).
[TABLE 2 HERE]
Before we use our data to test our hypotheses about the structure of the caucus
network, we would like to verify that using caucus memberships to describe patterns of
relationships between legislators is logical and meaningful in expected ways. We
therefore look for four expected relationships in the social network data. First, we expect
that legislators from the same party will be more connected in the caucus network. If we
did not find this to be true, we would question the validity of our data. Second, we
expect that ideologically close legislators will be more connected to one another in the
caucus network than legislators who are ideologically distant. Third, we expect that pairs
of legislators who served more terms together will be more connected. Since serving
more term concurrently provides the potential for more direct and social interaction, we
would be surprised if we did not find this relationship in the data. Finally, we expect that
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pairs who serve on more committees together will be more connected to one another.
Committee service provides the opportunity for (potential) social interaction and we
expect that the more legislators have had this opportunity the more likely they are to be
socially connected to one another.
To confirm these expected, benchmark relationships we use maximum flow as a
measure of connectedness between legislators and Bonacich’s eigenvector centrality as a
measure of centrality. Regarding party, we find that legislators from the same party are
significantly more connected in the caucus network than pairs of legislators from
different parties (maximum flow = 2078.5 versus 1974.7, t = -14.52, pr(t)=0.00). Next,
we expected Representatives who are close to one another ideologically to be more
closely connected within the network. Using Poole-Rosenthal NOMINATE scores to
measure ideological distance, we find that legislators who are less than the population
mean of .54 units apart from each other ideologically are more connected to one another
than legislators who are more distant (maximum flow = 2087 versus 1964.3, t = 17.11,
pr(t)=0.00). Third, we expect that legislators who have served more terms together will
be more closely connected in the network. Comparing the mean connectedness of dyads
where legislators have served less and more than the population mean of 3.87 terms
confirms this expectation: pairs of legislators that have served more than 3.87 terms
together are more connected to one another (maximum flow = 2600) than pairs who have
jointly served fewer than average terms (maximum flow = 1533.86, t = 170, pr(t)=0.00).
We did not find support for our final benchmark relationship regarding committee
service. We had expected that legislators who together serve on the same committee(s)
should be more connected in the caucus network, but the analysis shows that dyads of
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legislators who are on at least one committee together have an average connectedness of
2004.84, which is statistically significantly less than the average connectedness of
legislators who do not serve on any committees together (2032.97, t = 3.25, pr(t) = 0.00).
This negative effect is even more pronounced for legislators who serve on two or more
committees together. Here, the average connectedness is 1907.09, which is statistically
significantly less than the average connectedness score of 2028.8 for dyads of legislators
who serve on one or no committees together (t = 4.28, pr(t) = 0.00). The finding that the
voluntary membership in caucuses does not match up with committee assignments
suggests that self-selection into caucuses entails greater preference coherence among
caucus members than formal committee membership. Also, these results may be skewed
by the distribution of this variable since 78 percent of dyads share no committee seats.
Only 20 percent of dyads have one committee in common and 1.5 percent of dyads have
two committees in common. While we did not find the expected relationship regarding
committee service, in general our benchmark expectations held true, giving us greater
confidence in the reliability of these data and the strength of the inferences we can draw
from them.

While this social network analysis provides some intriguing insights into the
caucus-based network in the House of Representatives, it has not yet addressed our
expectations, laid out above, about who is connected to whom within the caucus network.
Table 3 shows the results of T-tests we used to test our hypotheses.vii
[TABLE 3 HERE]
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The second part of the social network analysis focuses on our theoretical
proposition about the social utility of participation in the caucus network, which
contradicts the argument of the existing literature that the caucus system constitutes an
alternative institutional structure that allows the formally disadvantaged to advance their
interests and positions in the legislature. Our expectation was that the caucus structure
does not benefit those in structurally weak positions in the formal institutional framework
of parties and committees, but that it replicates and reinforces the formal distribution of
power as rank-and-file members seek to build and maintain relationships with already
powerful and influential colleagues. Our two key hypotheses concerned the relative
connectedness and centrality of legislative leaders and non-leaders on the one hand, and
senior and junior legislators on the other. While we expected that leaders and more senior
legislators should be both more connected and central (Hypotheses 1 and 2), the extant
literature maintains that this should be the case for non-leaders and junior legislators.
The analysis confirms our expectations and undermines the propositions of
previous research on caucuses in the House. First, we find that dyads where at least one
member holds a leadership position have a higher average connectedness score (of
2150.34) than dyads where neither member holds such a position (1991.28). Dyads where
both members are party leaders, meanwhile, have an even higher connectedness score, at
2298.46, compared to a connectedness score of 2023.03 for dyads where one or neither
member is a leader (t = -9.0, pr(t) = 0.00). In terms of centrality, we find that the 52 party
and committee leaders in the population of 438 legislators are more central in the network
than non-leaders. This result is only marginally statistically significant at the 0.075 level,
however.viii
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Second, the average connectedness for dyads where neither member has served
more than the population average of 6.16 terms is 1731.7, while the average
connectedness for dyads where at least one member has served more than 6.16 terms is
2183.28, a statistically significant difference. In other words, more senior legislators are
more connected within the caucus network. This effect is even more pronounced for
dyads where both members have served longer than the population mean, as the average
connectedness of these pairs of Representatives is 2525.50 (t = -64.01, pr(t) = 0.00).
Senior members are also more central than junior members. The average Bonacich
Eigenvector Centrality value for members who have been members of the House for
longer than the average 6.16 terms is 6.9, compared to 5.3 for members who have served
less than the average number of terms (t = -5.54, pr(t) = 0.00). Hypothesis 2 is supported.
Third, we used electoral vulnerability as an indicator of structural weakness. We
hypothesized, contrary to existing literature, that electorally safe legislators would be
more connected and more central in the caucus network. Evidence shows support for
hypothesis 3. We consider a legislator to be electorally vulnerable if she has won her
most recent election with a vote share of 55 percent or less.ix Electorally vulnerable
members are less connected in the network. The average connectedness of dyads where
neither member is vulnerable is 2044.24, while the connectedness of dyads where at least
one member is vulnerable is 1313.6 (t = -31.28). If both members are vulnerable, their
mean connectedness score is 1370.96, which is statistically less than connectedness in
dyads where one or neither member is vulnerable (2048.66) (t = 33.6, pr(t) = 0.00).
Finally, electorally vulnerable members are less central in the caucus network, with an
average Bonacich Eigenvector Centrality score of 4.13. This compares to 6.30 for
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members who are electorally safe. These findings suggest that vulnerable members do
not use caucuses to improve their electoral fortunes in the future by signaling to their
constituents both their policy priorities and their activism. Instead, they appear reluctant
to join caucuses, which raises questions about the extent to which structurally
disadvantaged legislators can use caucuses to improve their institutional positions.
Perhaps it is the case that electorally safe legislators have the luxury of spending more
time in Washington, D.C. cultivating relationships with their colleagues rather than
spending it in the district wooing voters. Whatever the reason, the results show that
legislators with an electoral advantage have the additional advantage of being more
central and more connected in the caucus network.
The evidence presented thus far shows support for our contention that structurally
disadvantaged legislators do not tend to use the caucus system as a means of advancing
their status. Our data allow us to further examine this result and determine whether
legislators who may be at a social disadvantage because of gender or race use the caucus
system differently than those who do not face such disadvantages. Our expectation is
that legislators who qualify as socially disadvantaged because of their descriptive
characteristics will be no less disadvantaged in the network than those who are in the
social majority (Caucasian males). Our results support this expectation. Dyads that
include only Caucasian males are no more connected than dyads that include at least one
woman or ethnic minority (African American, Asian American, Latino, or Native
American). The magnitude of these connections are not large (2028.47 versus 2025.13),
and not statistically significant. Moreover, male Caucasians are no more central in the
network than females or minorities. Legislators who are female or ethnic minorities have
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a centrality score of 5.89 whereas legislators who do not fall into those categories have a
score of 5.99—a difference that is not statistically significant. These results suggest that
legislators who may be at a social disadvantage because of their gender or race, do not
use the caucus system to help them make-up the difference.
Our final analysis allows us to test the portions of our hypotheses that speak to the
frequency with which members join caucuses. The prior tests examined members’
connectedness and centrality in the network. However, we are also interested in the
number of caucuses legislators join. As indicated above, our expectation is that leaders,
senior members, and electorally safe members will join more caucuses, while women and
ethnic minorities will not join significantly more caucuses than their counterparts. The
results of a negative binomial model are presented in Table 4. The dependent variable in
this model is a count of the number of caucuses a legislator has joined.
The results of the estimation show that legislators who have served more terms
join more caucuses. This positive and statistically significant coefficient is consistent
with expectations. While we had no prior expectations about party affiliation, the results
show that Democrats join more caucuses than Republicans. This may be due to the fact
that Democrats had a majority share of seats in the 110th Congress. With respect to
electoral vulnerability, the positive and significant coefficient is consistent with our
hypotheses. Legislators who win their elections by a greater electoral margin join more
caucuses than those who win by smaller margins. The results with respect to party and
committee leaders, female legislators, and ethnic minority legislators are mixed. The
model in Table 4 includes an interaction of the terms for leaders and female or minority.
This is because we suspect the rate with which women and minorities join caucuses may
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be conditioned on whether they are party or committee leaders. The 110th Congress has
several female and minority leaders (e.g., Speaker Pelosi, Chairman Conyers, Chairman
Rangel, etc.) and if our theory about caucus networks mirroring existing institutions is
correct, then the relationship between leadership and female and minority legislators
should be conditional.
[TABLE 4 HERE]

The negative and statistically significant coefficient on leaders indicates that
Caucasian male party and committee leaders join relatively fewer caucuses than female
and minority leaders. This finding is not consistent with our expectations. However, the
coefficient merits further investigation because it is part of an interaction term (see
discussion below). In addition, the coefficient for “female and minority” shows that
female and minority non-leaders do not join caucuses at levels that are significantly
different from their counterparts. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis 4 above.
To provide further interpretation of these findings and the interaction term we
generated marginal effects and predicted probabilities (Tomz, et al. 2001; King, et al.
2000). After calculating the appropriate linear combinations and standard errors for the
marginal effects of leadership and female/minority legislators we found that the only
statistically significant effect is the effect of being a leader on caucus members for
Caucasian men—and the coefficient is negative and significant (equivalent to the
coefficient for “leader” in Table 4). Moreover, the predicted probabilities are such that
legislators who have a structural and social advantage (Caucasian, male, Democrats,
long-serving, electorally safe, leaders) will join a predicted 39 caucuses. Whereas,
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legislators who are structurally advantaged (leaders, electorally safe, etc.), but who are
also women or minorities will join a predicted 21 caucuses. Legislators who have no
structural advantage, but have the advantage of being a Caucasian male will join a
predicted 38 caucuses. Finally, a woman or minority legislator who has no structural
advantage will join a predicted 21 caucuses. We therefore predict that having the social
advantage of being a Caucasian male will lead such legislators will join an average of
38.5 caucuses; whereas having structural advantages such as leadership posts, electoral
security, and many years of service will lead such legislators to join an average of 30
caucuses.x
The results regarding the propensity of legislators to join caucuses are therefore
somewhat counter to our expectations. They show that being a minority, in terms of
gender or race, has a stronger effect on one’s probability of joining caucuses than being
in the institutionally advantageous positions of leadership, majority party, electoral
security, or longevity of service. While the results are counter to our expectations, when
put into context of the results regarding connectivity and centrality they provide an
interesting nuance to the story. We have found that party leaders, and others with
institutional advantages, are more connected and more central in the caucus system, but
not more likely to join caucuses. This somewhat counterintuitive result suggests that
those with institutional advantages act as caucus magnets. While leaders themselves do
not join more caucuses than non-leaders, they play a more critical role in the caucus
system. Those without such institutional advantages are therefore likely to join more
groups in an attempt to get close to those with the advantages. This puts the leaders in
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the strong position of being critical to the network, in terms of centrality and
connectivity, without having to join more groups.
In sum, the results of the network analysis completely support our expectations
with regard to leadership, electoral security, and length of service—legislators fortunate
enough to have these characteristics on their side are more central and more connected in
the caucus network. This evidence is consistent with our theoretical framework that the
caucus system mirrors the structure of existing legislative institutions such as parties and
committees and the same actors are powerful in each system. However, we also find
evidence that leaders join fewer caucuses and women and minorities join more, even
while women and minorities are not more central or more connected via the caucus
system. Those with social characteristics that put them at a disadvantage do seem to join
more groups (perhaps in an attempt to make up for their social disadvantages), but being
members of the extra caucuses has not moved them into positions that allow them to be
more central or more connected than the powerful leaders. All together, the evidence is
generally consistent with our updated perception of the caucus system—it helps the
powerful retain power.

Conclusion
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, from a theoretical point of
view, we conceptualize the caucus system as a social network. This deviates from
previous research on informal groups in Congress, which favors individualistic
explanations and disregards the role of social relations in shaping political behavior. Our
conceptualization, however, challenges the proposition that caucuses are venues for
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formally disadvantaged legislative actors to counter-balance their structural weakness by
building their standing in the informal institutional framework of the caucus system. We
maintain that participation in caucuses is about maximizing the social utility of one’s
relationships within the institution, which implies that legislators seek to associate
themselves with colleagues in positions of formal power. As a result, the caucus system
replicates and reinforces, rather than supplements and challenges, the formal distribution
of power in the legislature.
From a substantive standpoint, our results support our theoretical propositions,
which means that the conventional wisdom regarding the role of caucuses in the U.S.
House of Representatives is in need of revision. Our empirical analyses, using the most
extensive database of caucuses and caucus membership to date, demonstrates that
caucuses are not organizations used by junior representatives, legislators from marginal
districts, women, and non-party leaders to make an impact. Instead, our research confirms
our expectation that caucuses are institutions that favor legislative leaders and senior
members, who are both more central and more connected in the caucus network. This is
an important finding if caucuses fulfill their designated functions of facilitating
information exchange and helping to coordinate legislative action, since the caucus
system does not appear to be an alternative venue for these activities that challenges the
formal legislative structure. Independently, we found that while congressional leaders
are more central and more connected in the caucus system, they tend to join fewer
caucuses than non-leaders, while women and minorities join more. In tandem with the
social network analysis, we interpret these results to mean that legislators with structural
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advantages are caucus magnets and others have a tendency to join many groups in an
attempt, perhaps, to have connections to the leaders and senior members.
In methodological terms, our paper demonstrates the value of using social
network analysis as a tool in investigating legislative politics and decision-making. We
add to the burgeoning body of literature in political science that is borrowing
sophisticated social network methods from other disciplines and adopting them to help
answer questions of import and interest to scholars of politics. The inherent social
connectedness of politics is intuitive but nearly wholly lacking from political science
discourse. It is imperative that we integrate more rigorous theory and methods into the
discipline that allow us to incorporate measures of relationships between actors into
models that explain political behavior and institutions.
This paper provides an important update to the existing literature in legislative
politics. Using a social network framework we demonstrate that informal legislative
member organizations do not necessarily provide legislators who are institutionally weak
a vantage point from which they can improve their position; rather, the same legislators
that are powerful in the party and committee systems, are powerful in the caucus system.
The insight we have provided about how legislators use the caucus system is a direct
result of conceptualizing the caucus system as a social network. This research helps to
demonstrate the utility of such methods. That being said, we have left open many areas
for future research on this topic. We have not addressed the roles that caucuses play in
the legislative process. Another important topic for future investigation concerns
specifying the circumstances under which our propositions about the social utility of
caucus membership hold. It may be the case, for example, that we can observe some of
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the patterns highlighted in previous research when examining particular sub-samples of
caucuses (e.g., especially active, important, or visible ones). In other words: much
remains to be learned, and we hope to make a contribution to a greater understanding of
this under-researched part of the literature both with this paper and in additional studies.
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Table 1: Dyads with Highest Maximum Flow Scores
Name
Waxman, Henry A. (Democrat, California-30th)
Waxman, Henry A. (Democrat, California-30th)
Van Hollen, Chris (Democrat, Maryland-8th)
Van Hollen, Chris (Democrat, Maryland-8th)
McNulty, Michael R. (Democrat, New York-21st)
Waxman, Henry A. (Democrat, California-30th)
McNulty, Michael R. (Democrat, New York-21st)
Van Hollen, Chris (Democrat, Maryland-8th)
Waxman, Henry A. (Democrat, California-30th)
Doggett, Lloyd (Democrat, Texas-25th)
Hinchey, Maurice D. (Democrat, New York-22nd)
Van Hollen, Chris (Democrat, Maryland-8th)
Hinchey, Maurice D. (Democrat, NewYork-22nd)
Waxman, Henry A. (Democrat, California-30th)
McNulty, Michael R. (Democrat, New York-21th)
Hinchey, Maurice D. (Democrat, New York-22th)
McIntyre, Mike (Democrat, North Carolina-7th)
Van Hollen, Chris (Democrat, Maryland-8th)
Waxman, Henry A. (Democrat, California-30th)
McNulty, Michael R. (Democrat, New York-21st)
McIntyre, Mike (Democrat, North Carolina-7th)

Name
Van Hollen, Chris (Democrat, Maryland-8th)
McNulty, Michael R. (Democrat, New York-21st)
McNulty, Michael R. (Democrat, New York-21st)
Doggett, Lloyd (Democrat, Texas-25th)
Doggett, Lloyd (Democrat, Texas-25th)
Doggett, Lloyd (Democrat, Texas-25th)
McDermott, James A. (Democrat, Washington-7th)
McDermott, James A. (Democrat, Washington-7th)
McDermott, James A. (Democrat, Washington-7th)
McDermott, James A. (Democrat, Washington-7th)
McDermott, James A. (Democrat, Washington-7th)
Hinchey, Maurice D. (Democrat, New York-22nd)
Doggett, Lloyd (Democrat, Texas-25th)
Hinchey, Maurice D. (Democrat, New York-22nd)
Hinchey, Maurice D. (Democrat, New York-22nd)
McIntyre, Mike (Democrat, North Carolina-7th)
Doggett, Lloyd (Democrat, Texas-25th)
McIntyre, Mike (Democrat, North Carolina-7th)
McIntyre, Mike (Democrat, North Carolina-7th)
McIntyre, Mike (Democrat, North Carolina-7th)
McDermott, James A. (Democrat, Washington-7th)
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Maximum Flow
6766
6766
6766
6370
6370
6370
6357
6357
6357
6357
6326
6326
6326
6326
6326
6323
6323
6323
6323
6323
6323

Table 2: Most Central Legislators in the Caucus Network
Name
Waxman, Henry A. (Democrat, California-30th)
McNulty, Michael R. (Democrat, New York-21th)
Van Hollen, Chris (Democrat, Maryland-8th)
Doggett, Lloyd (Democrat, Texas-25th)
McDermott, James A. (Democrat, Washington-7th)
Hinchey, Maurice D. (Democrat, New York-22th)
McIntyre, Mike (Democrat, North Carolina-7th)
Larsen, Rick (Democrat, Washington-2nd)
English, Phil (Republican, Pennsylvania-3rd)
Payne, Donald M. (Democrat, New Jersey-10th)
Pallone, Frank, Jr. (Democrat, New Jersey-6th)
Moore, Dennis (Democrat, Kansas-3rd)
Smith, Adam (Democrat, Washington-9th)
Wilson, Addison G. (Joe) (Republican, South Carolina-2nd)
Holt, Rush D. (Democrat, New Jersey-12th)
Capuano, Michael E. (Democrat, Massachusetts-8th)
Moran, James P., Jr. (Democrat, Virginia-8th)
Maloney, Carolyn B. (Democrat, New York-14th)
Abercrombie, Neil (Democrat, Hawaii-1st)
McGovern, Jim (Democrat, Massachusetts-3rd)
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Normalized Degree
Centrality
29.03636
28.67192
28.67192
26.99381
26.93872
26.80736
26.79464
26.34545
25.89626
25.23095
25.0784
25.02331
24.7521
24.15883
23.98932
23.71811
23.36215
23.25621
22.73074
22.67141

Normalized
Eigenvector Centrality
15.14773
14.75355
15.0483
14.20062
14.12669
13.82869
13.24581
13.57402
12.92506
13.20031
13.02561
12.66654
12.61438
11.78937
12.43882
12.46857
12.21354
12.10695
11.61301
11.87619

Table 3: T-Testsfor Hypotheses1-4

Hypothesis
1

1

2

2

3

3

4

4

Mean Connectedness
(maximum flow)
1991.28

Bonacich's
Eigenvector
Centrality
-

2150.34

-

Description
Party/Committee Leadersare more
connected

Variable
Neither member of dyad is a leader

Party/Committee Leadersare more
central

Party/Committee Leaders

-

6.55

Non-Leaders

-

5.87

Senior members are more connected

Neither member of dyad hasserved longer
than mean terms(6.16)
At least one member of dyad hasserved
longer than mean terms (6.16)
Senior members(served at least 6.16 terms)

1731.70

-

2183.28

-

-

6.90

Junior members(served lessthan 6.16 terms)

-

5.30

Neither member of the dyad iselectorally
vulnerable
At least one member of the dyad iselectorally
vulnerable (won prior election with lessthan
55%)
Electorally vulnerable

2044.24

-

1313.6

-

-

4.13

-

6.30

2028.47

-

2025.13

-

-

5.99

-

5.89

Senior members are more central

Electorally vulnerable legislators are
moreconnected

Electorally vulnerable legislators are
morecentral

At least one member of dyad is aleader

Electorally safe

Female and ethnicminority legislators Both membersof the dyad are male and
are no more connected than male and Caucasian
Caucasian legislators
At least one member of the dyad isa female or
ethnic minority
Female and ethnicminority legislators Male Caucasians
are no more central than male and
Females and ethnic minorities(black, latino,
Caucasian legislators
asian, native american)
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T
-18.55

Pr(T)
0.00

Result
supported

-1.44

0.08

supported

-61.2

0.00

supported

-5.54

0.00

supported

-31.28

0.00

supported

-5.28

0.00

supported

0.4669

0.64

supported

0.283

0.78

supported

Table 4: Negative Binomial Results
Number of Caucuses
Joined
coefficient
z
0.0440
Terms Served
4.9
(0.0090)
Party (1 = Republican)
Electoral Vulnerability
Leader
Female or Minority
Female or Minority *
Leader
Constant
N
Log pseudolikelihood
ln(alpha)
alpha

-0.1633
(.0580)

0.0057
(0.0022)

-0.2353
(0.0974)

-0.0438
(0.0601)

0.2064
(0.1599)

2.9330
(.3515)

-2.82
2.62
-2.41
-0.73
1.3
8.34

437
-1789.5
-1.5833
(.0846)

0.2053
(0.0174)

Dummy variables for 49 states included but not
reported; Robust, Huber-White standard errors
reported in parentheses
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i

We will use the term “congressional caucus” inclusively to refer to all informal legislative member

organizations, informal groups, working groups, and task forces. We do not include formal party
organizations, formal party committees, standing or ad hoc legislative committees.
ii

The exact number of caucuses in the U.S. House is dynamic and varies depending on the criteria one uses

to determine caucuses. The House Committee on Administration lists 276 legislative member organizations
on its website (http://cha.house.gov/member_orgs.aspx). However, several hundred other such
organizations are known to exist. The Congressional Research Service lists 394 caucuses in their report
(Mansfield 2008). The Congressional Yellowbook includes mentions of 559 distinct caucuses in the
membership listings for individual legislators.
iii

To confirm this conjecture we analyzed the mean number of discharge petitions, days in session, and roll

calls for the past 10 sessions of Congress (back to 1999). We found no statistically significant difference
between the 110th Congress and these prior Congress, with the exception of the bills introduced in the first
session. The 110th Congress had an unusually high number of bills introduced in the first session (2007),
which is likely due to the change in party power after the 2006 elections. However, we have no reason to
believe that such increased activity would appreciably affect members’ decisions to join caucuses.
iv

This number surely includes some error because many legislators reported being members of groups with

very similar names (e.g., the Medical Doctor’s Caucus, Medical Malpractice Caucus, and the Medical
Malpractice Crisis Task Force all appear in the Yellowbook with only 1 member each). We assume many of
the similarly-named groups are actually the same caucus but erred on the side of caution and conservatively
assumed that each caucus listed by legislators was a “true” caucus—there are 108 caucuses that have 1 or
fewer members. A caucus has zero members if it is listed in the CRS report as existing but never appears in
the Yellowbook as having any members.
v

The logic of this measure suggests that it is the availability of pathways between actors that makes a

linkage strong, as opposed to distance or some other measure of connectedness. For example, if member A
needs to send a message to member Z and she can only use member C to send it, the connection between A
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and Z is weak. On the other hand, if A can send a message to Z via C, D, E, F, or G, then the connection
between A and Z is stronger (Hanneman and Riddle 2005).
vi

For more details, also see Fowler 2006, p. 465.

vii

We are unable to do a multivariate or regression analysis to test these hypotheses because the dependent

variable we wish to test is a network measure. Using a measure of network centrality or connectedness as a
dependent variable in a traditional regression model would violate the basic assumptions of regression and
independence of observations (see Scott 2000; Wasserman and Faust 1994). Therefore, to test these
hypotheses we have relied on descriptive network analysis and basic t-tests.
viii

Leaders include Speaker, Majority and Minority Leader, Majority and Minority Whip, Committee Chair

and ranking committee member.
ix

We also considered a less conservative level of 60% and found similar results.
Predicted probabilities were generated using “Clarify” (Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King
(2001). CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results. Version 2.0 Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University, June 1. http://gking.harvard.edu)
x

37

